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REFRESHING RECOLLECTION
[CONCLUDED FROM THE NOVEMBER NUMBER.]
NOT READING
Occasionally the courts realize that reading from a book is
equivalent to putting it in evidence. In a suit against a bank for
neglecting to collect a note sent it for collection, the defense was
that the note had not in fact been sent to the defendant. The
cashier and the officers deposed for the plaintiff, and in the dep-
osition inserted copies of entries in the bank books. This was
considered an oblique way of infroducing the entries themselves.
"If the books, supported by the oath of those who made them,
were conceived to be evidence, they should have been offered,
and upon proper identification, produced at the trial." '  A mem-
orandum of a conversation might be used by the person who
made it, to refresh his memory, by a silent perusal of it, but it
could not be read to the jury.' In order to ascertain that a sale
of goods was made to a certain person, at a certain date, and
what they were, the merchant was permitted to look at his book
of original entries, kept by himself, and, having thus refreshed
his recollection, "to state what goods he sold to Matthew Cast-
ner, but lie is not to read [i. e., aloud to thejury] off his books." '
'Nat. Bank of Dubois v. Nat. Bank of Williamsport, 114 Pa. 1. in
Juniata Bank v. Brown, 5 S. & R. 226, it is said that a witness, ex-
amined at the bar, may look at his notes for the purpose of refreshing
his memory and then if he can, with a safe conscience, he may swear
from his own recollection, but he would not be permitted to read his
notes to the jury. A witness could not properly insert in his deposition
an extract from a book, the averment in which is intended to be eviden-
tial of the thing averred.
'Com. v. Klein, 42 Super. 66.
3Shannon v. Castner, 21 Super. 294.
59
60 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
A witness had no personal knowledge of the sale and delivery of
goods by A, his employer, to B. He had made out bills from
memoranda furnished by others. A book called the bill book
contained letter press copies of bills which he bad made out.
He was asked and allowed to refresh his memory by the bill
book. The practical effect was to get the bills themselves in
evidence through the thin disguise of filtering their contents
through the witness. That is, the reading of the book and an-
nouncing what he read, was virtually- putting the book in evi-
dence.'
WITNESS INTERPRETING HIS BOOKS
The question was whether G was employed by Dodge between
certain dates. It was attempted to negative this employment by
showing that 0 was employed at this time by another, by Dickin-
son. Dickinson testified that 0 had worked for him. He could
not say when nor how long. It was then proposed to show by
Dickinson, after he had examined his books, that he believed that
G worked for him between certain days. The witness might say
that he believed the entries in his books, indicating payments of
certain dates to G for work to be correct. "It could only be on
his knowledge that the entries were a truthful record of his trans-
actions made at the time." '
USE OF MEMORANDUM IN CROSS-EXAM1INATION
When a paper is used not as substantive evidence of the
facts averred in it, but simply to refresh the memory, it cannot
be put in evidence by the party who causes the witness to use it
for refreshing his memory. The opposite party, however, has
a right to see, and to have the jury see it; to put it, therefore, in
evidence' for the purpose of contradicting the witness who pro-
fesses that his memory has been refreshed by it.'
IDENTIFICATION OF THE MEMORANDUM
When a memorial of a transaction is to be used as evidence
of it, the memorial must be identified by a witness as being such
'Owen v. Rothermel, 21 Super. 561.
2 Dodge v. Bache, 57 Pa. 421.
31 Wigmore, ]Xvid. p. 856.
'Gilmore v. Wilson, 53 Pa. 194. Obscure dictum of Agnew, J.
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and as being a correct history of the transaction. A claim was
made by a physician against the estate of C. Magee. The phy-
sician's clerk testified that he kept no regular books, that in this
case he made entries of the time devoted to Mr. Magee, obn cards,
each day, that she, the clerk, made a note of the time also, on a
little memorandum and compared it with the physician's entries
on the cards, which she thus found to be correct; that bills were
sent to Mr. Magee, founded on these cards. The bills were not
in evidence. Ten of the cards were offered. They were rejected.
(a) They were not a book of original entries; (b) the cards pro-
duced could not be known by the clerk to be the cards, whose
accuracy she had discovered by comparing the entries on them
with her own memoranda. They had no characteristic earmarks.
They were not in her exclusive possession. The cards produced
might have been substituted by the physician for the original
cards.' A book was produced by the plaintiff. He swore that
the entries in it were made at the dictation of the defendant; that
defendant told him the figures and he put them down accurately.
The book was received in conjunction with the testimony.2
ORIGINAL COGNITION NECESSARY
There can be no refreshing of a memory which has not once
existed. The witness must at one time have had a knowledge of
the fact to which he is to testify, in order that he may speak from
a revived memory of it. Hence, when A has no personal knowl-
edge of sales and deliveries of goods, when he makes out bills
founded on memoranda of such sales which are furnished to him
by those who made the sales, and when he has made letter press
copies of these bills, one of the objections to his testifying to sales
to X, after an inspection of the letter press copies of the bills, is
that A never had knowledge of the sales, he knew only that re-
ports had been made to him of sales.3 Contemporaneous entries
in books in the ordinary course of business are original evidence
when the subject of the entry is within the peculiar [why pecu-
Magee's B4state, 50 Pitts. L. J. 59. Over, 3., quotes from Withers
v. Atkins, 1 W. 236, as to the conditions under which a memorandum by
which a witness has refreshed his memory, can be put in evidence.
2Mead v. White, 6 Sadler 38.
'Owen v. Rothermel, 21 Super. 561.
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liar?] knowledge of the person making it, andowhere no motive
to prevent the truth is apparent. It is essential to the competency
of such evidence, however, that the person making the entry
have personal knowledge of the subject; otherwise the evidence
is hearsay and inadmissible.'
PAPER A COPY
Apparently, a copy of an original may be used by a witness
who made both, to refresh his memory, or, supported by his
testimony, as substantive evidence. The plaintiff testified that he
had cariied merfiorandum books till they were worn out. He
had transcribed from them to the paper which he had in court.
On his swearing that each of the items on the paper was truthful,
the court allowed him to "use the paper. '  A book account
copied from memoranda made after the delivery of the goods for
whose price suit was brought, was received, after proof by the
plaintiff that he had made both the memoranda and the book.3
In a suit against a fire insurance company, a particular statement
of loss was put in evidence. The plaintiff and his son could
prove the items, and state that the statement was made by them.
The fact that they referred to invoices and other papers to assist
them in remembering the articles and prices does not necessarily
give the statement the character of a copy, of secondary evidence.
The point of the matter is that they swear to the statement as
their own work made out from their knowledge of the facts. One
may know that he received and had the articles set forth in cer-
tain invoices and that these articles, or a certain number of them,
were destroyed by fire, and yet be unable to remember the items
without the assistance of the invoices to refresh his memory.'
Apparently an "extract" from a book of original entries, might
be used to refresh the memory.'
FICTITIOUS REFRESHMENT OF MEMORY
Use of the oral or written statement of another as to a fact;
e. g., as to the date of a conversation, may be attempted, not to
1 Com. v. Berney, 28 Super. 61.
2Mead v. White, 6 Sadler 38.
3 Wagonsellerv. Brown, 7 C. C. 663. B5hrhartv. Katzen, 25Lanc. 358.
'Allegheny Ins. Co. v. Hanlon, 31 Leg. Int. 372.
'Juniata Bank v. Brown, 5 S. & R. 226.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
refresh, but to supersede, the memory of a witness. A witness,
plaintiff's attorney, had testified to a conversation with the de-
fendant, had in November or December, 1884. On cross-exam-
ination the defendant offered to hand to the witness a letter from
the plaintiff's husband and agent to the defendant, dated January
9th, 1885, for the purpose of refreshing his recollection from the
contents so as to determine whether the conversation occurred in
November, December or January. The offer was rejected.'
BOOKS OF ORIGINAL ENTRIES
A book of original entries may be used, as such, without the
precondition that any one should testify to the accuracy of the
items contained in it, which are to be employed as evidence, and
without their reviving a remembrance in any one of the facts
mentioned in them. But, it is also clear that the keeper of the
book may be able to say that the entries therein were made im-
mediately after the respective transactions, and to agree with
these transactions. Since the evidence act of 1869, said the
supreme court, the book entries are not the foundation of the
action. The party is the witness, and he uses the books as a
memorandum "to refresh and assist his memory."
2
TIME OF MAKING A MEMORANDUM
When a memorandum is used as itself evidence when
supported by the witness as a past but true record, the truth of
the memorandum depends on the knowledge of the things nar-
rated in it by the maker at the time of making it. For evidence
of this knowledge it would be necessary to depend on the testi-
mony of the person who made it, or who read it, that he knew its
averment to be true. If a short interval only had elapsed between
the event and the writing of the history of it, that would be one
guarantee of its possible accuracy. If a considerable interval had
intervened, the accuracy could be rendered suspicious. When a
paper is used to refresh memory, in the correct sense of that ex-
'Steele v. Wisner, 141 Pa. 63. The objections made to the evidence
were, it did not appear that the witness was present when the letter was
written, or authorized the writing of it, or was connected with it in any
way.
'Barnett v. Steinbach, 4 Lug. Leg. Reg. 138.
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pression, since an inaccurate paper may refresbo, it is illogical to
insist that the paper should have been made at any particular
time. The courts, however, not seldom insist that the memoran-
dum should have been made or perused by the witness at or
shortly after the occurrence which it embodies.
WHO MAKES THE MEMORANDUM
Whether a memorandum is made by the person who as a
witness uses it or not ought to be immaterial, whether it is used
-as a means of reviving a memory, or as a record of a past knowl-
edge. A man's memory can be revived, not merely by his own
memoranda or by suggestions originating with himself; but by
the remarks, written or oral, made by others. A false memo-
randum may revive a true recollection. If the memorandum is
used as embodying a past knowledge of the witness, it is evident
that its having been made by the witness is not a prerequisite to
this embodiment. A may read a narrative by B of an event which
both he and B had seen, shortly after the event, and may as well
know whether the narrative is true or not, as if he had written it
himself. In Babb v. Clemson1 the same paper was used by two
witnesses, who were examined as to what things had been sold
by the sheriff. Perhaps neither of them made, certainly both of
them did not make, it. The court justified the use of it, because,
not being itself evidence, "the only use made of it by the witness
was to refresh his memory." A person who inspects a memo-
randum at the time of its making by another, which is simultaneous
with the facts narrated in it, may use it to refresh his recollection.2
The matter to be proved was what X testified in a former trial.
Huston, J., was unwilling to say more than that "perhaps" 3 a
witness could refresh his memory by notes or memoranda made
by another person, when he looked over the writer, and.saw that
what was being written, was written correctly; or where he im-
mediately after it was written read it over and found it correct,
112 S. & R. 328. In Huckenstein v. Jolly, 42 Leg. Int. 321, 2 Lanc.
164, Trunky, J., points out that in Babb v. Clemson, the same paper
was used by two witnesses, and that, so far as appears, neither made it.
2Huckenstein v. Jolly, 42 Leg. Int. 321.
3The hesitancy of the judge on such a point is clearly the result of
a limited observation of the operations of the human memory.
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and when he can positively swear that the paper he is using to
refresh his memory is the very one he thus verified. But a wit-
ness who heard X's testimony cannot refresh his memory of
it by reading notes of it made by another person, which notes he had
not seen until years after they were taken.' A paper, not appar-
ently made by witness, viz., a bill of sale of the plaintiff's goods,
had been compared by the witness with the goods in the plaintiff's
possesssion. This bill of sale was properly put, says Sharswood, J.,
in the hands of the witness to refresh his memory.'
IEMORANDUM OF THE WITNESS
A memorandum by X of a conversation is transcribed by a
type-writer. The accuracy of the transcription is verified by X
at the time. This transcript may by used by X, a witness, to re-
fresh his memory.' A conductor's report of the names, addresses,
and occupations of persons who saw an accident, may be used by
him.' A bank assigns for the benefit of creditors, having five
days before received deposits. In a prosecution for receiving
such deposit, knowing the bank to be insolvent, the account of
the assignees which stated that certain items in the inventory had
no value, and certain others less value than that assigned to them
by the inventory was put into the hands of one of the assignees, who
was a witness. It was not error to allow him to use it in order
to refresh his recollection.' For the same purpose an inventory
of articles in a factory, made under the supervision and direction
of X and verified by him, might be used by X.' An account of
labor done by A for the defendant may be used by A, who kept
it, as a witness. He was told to refresh his memory with his
'Withers v. Atkinson, 1 W. 236. The court judicially knows that
no human memory can latently remember for years, the testimony in
court of another, which memory may finally be evoked from sub-con_
sciousness by notes not made by the witness. But suppose they had
been made by the witness. Would they have stimulated the suppressed
memory, or would they rather be used as the embodiment of a past
knowledge?
'Striker v. McMichael, 1 Phila. 89 (District Court).
3Edwards v. Gimbel, 202 Pa. 30.
'Clark v. Traction Co., 210 Pa. 636.
5Com. v. Hazlett, 14 Super. 352.
OWells Whip Co. v. Ins. Co., 209 Pa. 488.
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papers and books, "beginning at the first charge you have ,and
working your way up."'
SINGLE FACTS
The use of a written record, narrative, etc., in order to "re-
fresh" the memory is not limited to numerous items, numerous
sales and deliveries, numerous things lost in a fire, numerous
,days' work, etc. A witness in fixing the date of a transaction
may refer to a book or diary to refresh his recollection. He may
-state that the entries of events therein were made at the time of
their occurrence and that he is able thereby to fix with accuracy
the date in question. 2 An accident happened to a passenger in
alighting from a street railway car. The conductor, according to
his instructions, takes the names, addresses and occupations of
passengers who see the occurrence and reports to his superiors.
In testifying for the traction company he could refer to this re-
port in order to refresh his memory as to the names, addresses
and occupations of the witnesses of the affair and the time of its
happening. Says Elkin, J., "more than two years and a half
having elapsed from the date of the accident to the time of the
trial, it was important that the -conductor should refer to his re-
port in order to definitely fix the time when the accident occurred,
the names of the witnesses who saw it and other circumstances
connected with the accident."' A land surveyor may look at his
field notes when he testifies about a line he has run, but if he in-
serts the declarations of a bystander, those declarations are not
evidence.' An engineer made a survey of dams and embodied
the results in a report which embraced not only what he ran and
could testify to, but matters communicated to him by others.
'Mead v. White, 6 Sadler 38. The memoranda could not be used as
original entries. The Supreme Court says the memoranda could be
used to refresh the memory by the witness "when he knows the entry
to have been correct when he made it." But if he knows that, why are
the memoranda not evidence, even if the memory is not revived?
2Nat. Bank of Dubois v. Nat. Bank of Williamsport, 114 Pa. 1.
3 Clark v. Traction Co., 210 Pa. 635. There was probably no re-
freshing of the memory as to names or time. The witness inferred
from the fact that he in his report made certain averments, that they
were correct. His report embodied a past, recollection.
'Dictum of Black, J.
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Called as a witness, he used his report to refresh his memory. He
stated from it all the facts ascertained by himself. The opposite
party then proposed, but was not allowed, to cross-examine him
upon the remainder of his report. This was proper.'
CONVERSATION
A conversation may be reduced to writing by one of the
parties to it, shortly after it occurs, and the minute thus made
may be used to refresh the memory of the person who made it.
Immediately after G had had a conversation with H, G made a
memorandum of it. The next day he had the memorandum
copied by a typewriter. He signed the copy and sent it to his
superior officer. He thus attested the accuracy of the copy. It
was not error to permit him as a witness "to refresh his recollec-
tion of the conversation by referring to the typewritten copy of
his memorandum."' A memorandum of a conversation with the
defendant on trial for the crime of bribery, made by the witness
immediately thereafter, was allowed to be referred to by the wit-
ness "for the purpose of refreshing his memory," but he was not
permitted to read it.'
FORMER TESTIMONY. USE OF PAST MEMORY
It is sometimes proper to prove the former testimony of a
witness. It is not within the scope of this article to discuss the
circumstances which justify the use of this former testimony.
One who has heard it and who remembers it, either without or
after a refreshment of his memory, may testify to it. Notes
may have been taken of it, either by the judge" who presided at
'Robeson v. Schuylkill Navigation Co., 3 Gr. 186.
2]ldwards v. Gimbel, 202 Pa. 30. How long time intervened be-
tween the conversation and the testimony in court does not appear. It
is probable that there was no refreshing of memory, only the use of a
past recollection embodied in the memorandum. Otherwise the accur-
acy of the memorandum would be unimportant. An inaccurate nar-
rative can revive a memory as readily as, and more clearly than, a true
narrative.
3Com. v. Kline, 42 Super. 66. How long the interval between the
conversation and the testimony? Did the witness really remember the
conversation after looking at the memorandum, or did he remember
merely the statement in the memorandum?
'4Miles v. O'Hara, 4 Binn. 108; Ricthrock v. Gallaher, 91 Pa. 108.
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the trial, or by a counsel1 in the case, or by a stenographer,2 and
these notes may be used as the embodiment of that testimony.
They are a written history of it. That they are the notes of the
judge or counsel or stenographer must be proved, but that is not
enough. They must be proved to have been so taken as to cor-
respond with the testimony. A certificate of the judge who took
them, that the notes are correct, a fortiori his certificate that a
copy of the notes is a correct copy, is insufficient. 8 He must,
the attorney or other person must, by deposition or by testimony
before the jury swear to their accuracy. When he so swears, the
notes may be received as evidence of the fact that witness tes-
tified as they report him to have testified. It is not necessary
that the witness (judge, counsel, etc.) should say that he rec-
ollects the testimony. He may say, "I don't recollect the testi-
mony, independent of the notes. " 4  In a case in which the coun-
sel who took the notes had not only authenticated them, but un-
dertaken to say what the former witness had testified, Gibson, J.,
observes, after saying that the counsel was competent to testify,
"It seems, however, singular that instead of trusting to Mr.
Fisher's recollection the plaintiff did not offer his notes in evi-
dence, against which, when properly authenticated, there could
be no sort of objection. 5 The judge who took the notes saying
that they were correct, but not testifying to a present memory of
the evidence, the witness himself, now 87 years old, feeble and
ill and his memory having failed, was unable to say what he tes-
tified to. He contented himself with saying that if he did testify so
and so, his testimony was correct and true. The notes were re-
ceivable in evidence, although unaccompanied by the testimony
'Correll v. Green, 10 S. & R. 14; Rhene v. Robinson, 27 Pa. 30; Chess
v. Chess, 17 S. & R. 407.
2 Com. v. Levi, 44 Super. 253.
3Miles v. O'Hara, 4 Binn. -t08. The judge was not called to prove
his notes. The witness, notes of whose testimony was taken, is called,
11 years after his first testimony, but he now has no recollection of a
certain fact, e.g., the serving of a notice. His testimony that if the notes
of the judge are correct, he testified he had served the notice, and, if he
testified that he served, he in fact served the notice, is not evidence.
Reed v. Orton, 105 Pa. 294.
"Chess v. Chess, 17 S. & R. 407.5Cornell v. Green, 10 S. & R. 14.
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of anyone that he remembered that the witness had sworn so.'
A stenographer who took the testimony and who testifies that
the notes are correct and full, says that he has now no recollec-
tion of the testimony. The notes are receivable.'
FORMER TESTIMONY. REFRESHING MEMORY
As notes of former testimony may be used as the embodiment
of a past memory of the testimony, without profession by a wit-
ness that, independently, or by means of them, he recalls the tes-
timony, so they may be used as a means of refreshing the mem-
ory, and the witness whose memory is thus refreshed may testify
to a present recollection of the testimony. Whether the former
witness who is called, in a later trial, to testify to the same sub-
ject, may refresh his memory by the former testimony (disclosed
to him by notes or otherwise) is said to depend in part on the
nearness of the former testimony to the occurrence of the facts
which constitute its subject matter. The earlier testimony must
have been delivered so shortly after the occurrence "that the facts
were still fresh in his mind." '
CASES OF DOUBTFUL REFRESHING
Cases are numerous in which the process of using a paper is
described as a refreshing of the memory of the witness, when it is
really authentication of the paper as a past record, and a use of
this record as evidence of the facts averred in it. A witness, e. g.,
is said to refresh his recollection of a conversation, when he re-
fers to a minute made of it immediately after its occurrence, though
'Rithrock v. Gallaher, 91 Pa. 108.
2Com. v. Levi, 44 Super. 2.53. The notes were taken in an investi-
gation in the Orphans' Court. They were used in a prosecution of the
witness for embezzlement. In Velott v. Lewis, 102 Pa. 326, Smith, 68
years old, was asked as to the condition of a building at a former date.
He said he did not remember when a certain addition was built. He re-
membered having testified before arbitrators. The notes of this tes-
timony were excluded because there was no evidence that Smith had
lost his memory since the arbitration, by old age or otherwise. 'He
simply failed to recollect what he had previously sworn.
'Smith v. Summerhill, 21 York 132. In Putnam v. United States,
162 U. S. 687, White, J., held that if 4 months intervened between the
occurrence and the first testimony, this testimony could not be used to
revive the memory of the witness at a later time.
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he was probably simply remembering that the minute said -the
conversation was this and this.' A paper is shown a witness, who
says it contains an exact copy of resolutions of the board of di-
rectors of a corporation, calling on the stockholders to pay their
subscriptions. He says, "I should say it was a copy" of the
notice sent to the stockholders. I have no reason to believe any
other kind of notice was sent [i. e., he argues with himself that
this is a copy; he does not recollect]. The paper was then put
in evidence. This process is said to be "permitting the witness
to refresh his recollection from a written notice." 2  The simple
reading from, or stating after perusal, the contents of a letter-press
copy of a bill is spoken of as a refreshing of the memory, although
the witness did not pretend to have had any knowledge of the
transaction mentioned in the letter, and could not remember the
particular bills he had sent out.3 Sales of articles made from
time to time are recorded in an account book. The vendor, as a
witness, uses this book, as the court says, to refresh his memory.
He probably had no memory of the sales in question." In Bar-
nett v. Steinbach' the supreme court per curiam, says, since the
act of i869, the plaintiff is the witness; his books are not the
foundation of his claim. He uses the book simply to refresh and
assist his memory. But it is evident that the memory is not re-
freshed. The averments of the book are the evidence upon proof
of the accuracy of them when made. A witness has made an
affidavit of a circumstance, two months after its occurrence, i. e.,
concerning the weight of a car. Having no present recollection
of the weight, his reference to the affidavit is said to be a refresh-
ing of the memory. It clearly was not. He had no memory."
Whether the seals of certain cars, whence pig tin had been
stolen, which cars came from Jersey City to Altoona, had been
broken before the arrival at Altoona was a question. Car in-
1Edwards v. Gimbel, 202 Pa. 30.2Car and Coach Co. v. Elsbree, 19 Super. 618.
3Oweu v. Rothermel, 21 Super. 561.
4Wagonseller v. Brown, 7 C. C. 663. The court says, however, that
the witness testified to most of the sales, and then produced the book
to identify the particular goods. The book was admissible for that pur-
pose.
54 Luz. Leg. Reg. 138.
6Samuel v. Pa. R. R., 45 Super. 395.
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spectors examine cars, and, if the seals of any have been broken,
they make memorandums. These memorandums are sent to an
officer of the railroad, who keeps a record of reports of broken
seals. This record disclosed no report of the breaking of the
seals of the cars in question. In the trial of B for having stolen
the pig tin in Blair county, it was held that this was not legiti-
mate evidence that the seals had not been broken before the cars'
arrival at Altoona. It was not shown that the original slips or
memoranda, made by the car inspectors, were still in existence.
There was no evidence that the record kept by the clerk of the
reports was accurate. Conceding that it could hardly be ex-
pected that the inspectors should remember the inspection of these
particular cars, Henderson, J., says that their memoranda might
be used by them to prove the fact of inspection; from such
fact and refreshing their recollection by the reports prepared by
them, they might be able to testify that the seals of the cars were
in good condition when they inspected them, because of their
practice of noting in the report any defect in that respect. But
it is clear that there would have been no refreshing of the recol-
lection. They would merely infer from the absence of reference
in these reports, to the cars in question, that they had found
nothing wrong, because had they found anything wrong they
would (such was their practice) have made the report, and, if they
had made the report, it would have been preserved or a record of
it made. Their testimony that the cars were in good condition
would be simply an inference.' An assignee for the benefit of
creditors testifying to the difference of value of certain articles as
estimated in the inventory, and as realized by a sale, his account
was offered and received in evidence. It had not been confirmed
nor its accuracy acquiesced in by the assignor. The object of
the evidence was to show that the assignor, a bank, in receiving
a deposit had done so with knowledge of his insolvency. Such
account, says the court, is not independent evidence that the items
therein indicated were of no value. If, however, it was offered and
used simply as a memorandum to refresh the recollection of the
witness, there was no reversible error in receiving it. '
1Coin. v. Berney, 28 Super. 61.
2Com. v. Hazlett, 14 Super. 352.
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MOOT COURT
GEORGE ACKERS v. WM. SHOMO
Trespass-Damages Caused by Exposure-Proximate Cause-
Necessity
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ackers was walking along a street on which Shomo dwelt, when
a terrible blizzard overtook him. Ackers was unable to advance
or retreat on account of the snow, and the cold was intense. In order
to escape the storm he opened the front door of Shomo's house and
sheltered himself in the vestibule. Shomo, discovering him there, asked
him what he was doing there? After Ackers' explanation he opened the
door and forcibly ejected him. Ackers was frost bitten by the cold, and
was attacked with pneumonia in consequence of the exposure.
Rowley for Plaintiff.
Singermafi for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SNYDER, J.-The Plaintiff relies on two points. The first is that
he was forcibly ejected without being asked to leave. Now in regard to
this, it is clearly shown that in entering he was a trespasser, and was
breaking the close of the defendant, yet if the defendant ejected him
forcibly without first asking him to leave and used more physical force
than was absolutely necessary, then he, the defendant, is liable. There
is no question about the right of the plaintiff to enter the vestibule of
the defendant's house; he clearly had no such right.
The second is that he had only the choice between two alternatives,
either to enter the vestibule, which he did, or expose himself in the
weather, to disease or some other and maybe worse result. His act was
involuntary, and under the facts of the case at hand justifiable, at least
from a moral standpoint, and for this reason he claims it was not a
trespass. P. & L. Digest of Decisions, Vol. 21, Col. 37483, "an act which
was involuntary or is the result of unavoidable accident, is not a trespass,
and the fact that an act causing injury is of such a character, is a com-
plete defense to an action of trespass based thereon."
Vol. 8, Forum 225, says, "that a tramp has a right, though he visits
uninvited a house for the purpose of getting a meal, not to be beset and
bitten by a dog whose vicious propensity is known by the dog's owner.
Now clearly this man had more right than an ordinary tramp, and
was entitled to some consideration at the hands of the defendant.
29 L. R. A., Note 154. When it is said a person may use as much
force as is necessary for the protection of his person or property, the
rule is subject to the most important modification, that he shall not, ex-
cept in extreme cases, endanger human life or cause great bodily harm.
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59 L. R. A. 771. A trespasser cannot recover for injuries not wan-
tonly or willfully inflicted, but in this case it would seem that there was
no other course open for the plaintiff to take, he had either to enter the
house or else stay outside and expose himself to the elements, the result
of which might be his death. This seems as though his entering the
vestibule, even if had no legal right, was such an act as to take from it
any manner or form of illegality, that would ordinarily attach to such an
act.
The defendant knew that when he put him out he was liable to suffer
from exposure, and it does not appear from the facts that he was such a
man as did not know the probable outcome of his act. He could clearly
foresee that it would result in great personal injury and perhaps death
and that his act of ejecting the plaintiff forcibly would be the prox-
imate cause of any injury resulting from exposure. Proximate cause
as defined in 32 Oyc. 745 is, "An act which directly produced or con-
curred in producing the injury, an immediate, direct or efficient cause
of injury; that cause which naturally leads to and might be expected to
produce the result." The defendant relies chiefly on the fact that the
plaintiff was a trespasser, yet in view of the facts of the case and the
authorities offered, it is doubtful whether he was a trespasser from a
moral viewpoint.
Defendant claims that he did not use excessive force, but this may
be rebutted and from the fact that he did not request the plaintiff to
leave before ejecting him, he was in the wrong.
Judgment for the Plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
It would be a barbarous and barbaric system of law which would
require a court to hold that the plaintiff in the present case has no cause
of action against the defendant. Fortunately the principles of the
common law as established in former adjudications do not require us to
so hold.
The common law does not permit the so-called owner of property to
make all conceivable uses of it nor does it permit him to exclude others
from making all conceivable uses of it. Acts, which under ordinary
circumstances would be trespasses, are sometimes excused by what
has been pertinently called the law of necessity.
An examination of the cases in which this rule of necessity has been
applied will disclose that they are so numerous and their facts so varied
as to raise the rule to the dignity of a general principle sufficiently
broad to justify a recovery by the plaintiff in the present case.
The law of necessity has been stated in the following language:
"Necessity for the performance of an act will, as a rule, excuse," 28
A. &. E. Encylc. 560. "Necessity is a supreme law over man, he is
powerless to contend against it. Therefore, the law of the land never
sets itself against this force and in whatever terms a law is expressed
it is construed as subject to this exception," Bishop Non-contract Law,
sec. 185. See also Pollock on Torts, 317.
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The law of necessity has been frequently invoked to justify an
entry upon the land of another. "It it clear," says the Vermont court,
"that an entry upon land may be justified by necessity," Ploof v. Putnan
(Vt.), 71 Atl. 188.
This rule is of ancient origin. In the Year Books it is stated, "If
a man by negligence suffer his house to burn, I, who am his neighbor
may break down the house to avoid danger to me," 1 Y. B., 9 Fd.,IV35,
and in the following early authorities entries upon land made under
various conditions were justified by the law of necessity, Miller v.
Tandrye, Poph. 161; 21 Edw., IV 64; Vin. Ab. Trespass, K. A. pl. 1.
Applying the rule it has been held that one who enters upon the
land of another in order to save his own, or the land owner's, or a third
person's property from destruction, is not guilty of a trespass. "It is a
very ancient rule of the common law," says the Massachusetts court,
"that an entry upon land to save goods from being lost or destroyed by
water- fire or other like danger is not a trespass," Proctor v. Adams,
113 Mass. 376. To the same effect are Chambers v. Bell, 2 W. &. S. 226;
Forster v. Bridge Co., 16 Pa. 395; Buck v. Weeks, 194 Pa. 522; Hugh v.
Williams, (Eng.) Ames. Cas. 170.
It is also well settled that a traveler upon a highway who finds it
obstructed by a sudden and temporary cause may pass upon the adjoin-
ing land without becoming a trespasser, Campbell v. Race, 7 Cush. 408;
Morey v. Fitzgerald, 56 Vt. 487; that one whose cattle trespass while
being driVen along the highway is not liable unless negligent, Tillett v.
Ward, 112 B. D. 17; and that one whose land is entered upon in defense
of the country can maintain no action against the defenders. Preroga-
tive Case, 12 Co. 12, Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dull. 353.
It will be observed that in none of these cases was the excusing
necessity of an absolute physical sort. The acts done were practically
necessary for the ordinary conduct of the affairs of life. If an entry
upon land to retake one's property, to save his own or another's property,
to avoid the temporary inconvenience of being unable to complete one's
journey is justified, surely such entry should be justified when necessary
to save human life.
This is the doctrine of the cases: "The doctrine of necessity applies
with special force to the preservation of human life." Ploof v. Putnan
(Vt.), 71 Ati. 188. Thus, one who is assaulted and in peril of his life may
run thru the close of another to escape his assailant, 37 Hen. VII, pl. 26,
Ames. Cas. 168n; one may sacrifice the property of another to save his
life or the lives of his fellows, Mouse's Case, 12 Co. 63, Ames Cas. 173;
Burlon v. Mc Clelland, 3 Ill. 424; King v. Kline, 6 Pa. 320; and one who
throws things upon the land of another to prevent injury to third per-
sons is not a trespasser, Dewey v. White (Eng.), Ames. Cas. 165.
The correction of the conclusion of the learned court below is con-
vincingly demonstrated by the authorities already cited, but btill more
convincing are the following two very recent American cases:
In Depue v. Hateau (Minn), 111 N. W. 1, the plaintiff, who was a
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cattle dealer, at the invitation of the defendant stayed and took supper
with him. Later the plaintiff became ill and requested permission to
stay over night or until he should get better. The defendant refused to
allow this, conducted the plaintiff from the house, assisted him to his
sleigh and started the team toward the plaintiff's home. On the way
home the plaintiff fell out of the sleigh and was severely frost bitten.
The court held that his action had been improperly dismissed, saying,
"The facts of this case bring it within the comprehensive principle that
whenever a person is placed in such a position with regard to another
that it is obvious that if he does not use care he will cause injury to
that person, the duty at once arises to exercise commensurate care * * *
and a negligent failure to perform this duty renders him liable for the
consequences."
In Ploof v. Putnan (Vt.), 71 Atl. 188, while the plaintiff and wife
and children were sailing, a violent tempest arose imperiling the boat
and its occupants. To save them the plaintiff was compelled to moor
the boat to the defendant's dock. The defendant unmoored the boat,
whereupon it was driven ashore by the tempest and destroyed and the
plaintiff and wife and children injured. A demurrer to the declaration
was overruled by the court, which said, "It is clear that an entry upon
land may be justified by necessity and that the declaration before us
discloses a necessity for mooring the sloop."
Judgment affirmed.
ADAM1 STRUPPLE v. JOHN CALY
Composition of Creditors-Fraud-Burden of Proof
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Strupple being indebted, his creditors caused a sale on execution of
his land. Of these creditors, there were eight. Caley and Sampson
were two of them. Caley and Sampson agreed with two other creditors
that Caley should be allowed by the rest alone to bid for the land, he
agreeing that if it was knocked down to him, he would transfer interests
therein to Sampson and the other tw' proportionate to their respective
judgments. The other two creditors were not parties to the agreement.
The sale was made to Cal ey, and he received the sheriff's deed. Strupple,
alleging the agreement fraudulent as to him and to the other two creditors,
inasmuch as it reduced competition, brings this ejectment.
Voorhis for Plaintiff.
Renard for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SOHN, J.-It can not be laid down as a general principle of
law that all cases in which there is a composition of creditors are nec-
essarily tainted with fraud. Each case must be examined minutely and
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determined upon its own particular facts. There atre in Pennsylvania
a large number of cases in which judgment sales have been set aside
because the very purpose for which the creditors combined was fraud-
ulent and against public policy. In Hay's Estate, 159 Pa. 381, a judicial
sale was set aside because the agreement between two of the lien
creditors was made without the knowledge or consent of the debtor, and
in Phelphs v. Benson, 161 Pa. 418, where the sale was made without the
knowledge of the plaintiff of an agreement between the creditors, and
the land secured for a price much below its actual value, the sale
was annulled. In Slingluff v. Eckel, 24 Pa. 472, the facts disclosed were
that by combining the creditors bought the land at a price much less
than they otherwise would have secured it for, and the sale was deemed
to be void. But in all these cases the reason for setting aside the sale
was because it was actually fraudulent. Either the combination was
effected by the creditors without the knowledge and consent of the debtor
or other creditors, the land was bought at a greatly reduced price, or the
very purpose was to directly reduce competition in bidding.
The present case narrows itself down to this question, "Was there
such actual fraud as reduced competition among the bidders at the sale?"
Upon examination of the facts we do not think that this was so. In
Kennedy v. Taylor, 15 Howard 520, the court was of the opinion as fol-
lows: "It is true," he said, "that in every association formed to bid at
a sale and who appoint one of their number to bid in behalf of the rest,
there is an agreement, express or implied, that no other member will
participate in the bidding, and hence, in one sense, it may be said to
have effect to prevent competition. But it by no means follows that if
the association had not been formed, and each member left to bid on his
own account, that the competition at the sale would be as strong and
efficient as it would by reason of the joint bid for the benefit and upon
the responsibility of all. The property at stake might be beyond the
means of the individual."
And in Braden v. O'Neil, 183 Pa. 462, we have a case in which, as in
the present case, only a portion of the creditors was embraced in the
combination. There the language of Williams, Judge, was as follows:
"This combination only embraced a portion of the creditors. It did not
look to preventing competition at the sale, or to depressing the price.
There must be actual fraud, such as a combination to purchase at an
undervaluation, or to discourage bidding by others, to justify setting
aside the sale or treating it as a nullity."
To the same effect as the above cases was the case of Woodruff v.
Trainer, 175 Pa. 302, where the judge in his opinion said, that "even a
combination between creditors does not necessarily indicate fraud.
Creditors whose money is in peril have rights as well as debtors.
Snull v. Jones, 6 W. & S. 127, is another case in which there was a
composition of creditors. "It is far from being true," said the judge in
that case, "that every agreement of this kind has a necessary tendency
to lessen the price that otherwise might be obtained for the property at
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the sale; on the contrary, it may tend to increase it. For instance, where
there are a number of creditors who singly have not ability to buy, but,
by uniting their means they are enabled to do so. they thus not only
create competition, but may be induced to give more than any other
persons are willing to give."
With these decisions in mind, what are the facts of the present case?
Caley and Sampson agreed with two other creditors that Caley should
be allowed by the rest alone to bid for the land, he agreeing that if it
was knocked down to him he would transferinterests therein to Sampson
and the other two creditors proportionate to their respective judgments.
The facts are not disclosed that Strupple or the other creditors were
ignorant of this agreement, nor does Strupple allege that the agreement
was fraudulent for that reason. He alleged simply that it was fraudu-
lent inasmuch as it reduced competition. What have we to show that
it did reduce competition? There is nothing to show that Strupple
would have received more for the land had each of the four creditors
who combined bid for the land separately, nor is there any proof that
their intention was to get the land at an undervaluation. We do not know
the exact reason why the combination between the four creditors was
effected, but we can not assume that their intention was necessarily
fraudulent. Individually they may have been unable to make a success-
ful bid for the land, but by combining their assets they may have been
able to let one of their number buy, and then satisfy theirinterests pro-
portionate to their respective judgments. Surely they, as creditors, have
a right to protect their interests the same as the debtor or the other
creditors. The plaintiff has not shown that any deceit, trick or im-
posture has been practiced by the defendant in securing the land. The
burden of proof in showing fraud, according to Black, Judge, in Abbey
v. Dewey, 25 Pa. 413, is upon the plaintiff. "It is very seldom," he says,
"that perfectly clear proof can be produced of a fraud, but the plaintiff
must introduce such evidence of fraud as one can reasonably and
safely rest his conscience upon." Here we can not see that there is
anything to show any fraud whatsoever on the part of the defendant or
that competition at the sale was reduced. We can not find against the
defendant upon a mere presumption.
Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
That the power to combine in purchasing might be abused so as to
cause a sacrifice of the property of the debtor is quite clear. There were
eight judgment debtors who would be interested in not allowing the
debtor's land to be sold for less than its value. Four of them combine,
and cease to be competitors witk each other. The number of potential
bidders, outside of non-lien creditors, was thus reduced to five. But, if
4 could unite, 8 could, in which case there would be no competition, un-
less non-creditors should be present and bid at the sale. Nowithstand-
ing this possibility, several cases cited by the learned 'ourt below, re-
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fuseto find in such agreement for joint purchase, any wrong to the debtor,
of which he could complain. The judgment reached by the learned
court below must be affirmed.
HINKLE v. CARROL
Check-Delay in Presentmen t-Liabi ty of Drawer-Burden of
Proof-Statute of Limitations
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Carroll gave Hinkle a check on a bank for $175 on August 16, 1902.
Hinkle mislaid the check and forgot it until he found it in 1908. On
June 5th, 1908, he presented it to the bank, which told him that Carroll
had ceased to have a deposit in the bank for 2 years. Hinkle sues Car-
rol on August 16, 1908, upon the check and also upon the debt.
Sasscer for Plaintiff.
Shearer for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
STRITE, 3.-The question in the case is whether by reason of
Hinkle's delay in presenting the check for payment the presentation to
him of the check did not operate as satisfaction of the debt. If he had
presented the check for payment between August 16, 1902, and some
time during 1906, he would have been paid. The failure to pay the
check was, therefore, in large measure due to his negligence in not pre-
senting it within a reasonable time. Does his "mislaying and for-
getting" about the check for more than four years excuse him? Webe-
lieve not. Such a rule would make it necessary in many cases for men
to keep large sums of money on deposit for several years subject to the
whims of negligent men and lapses of defective memories.
It has long been held that as between the holder of a check and the
drawer a demand at any time before suit is brought will be sufficient,
unless it appears that the drawee has failed or the drawer has in some
other manner been affected by the delay. 3 Kent 88. But it has also
been held that the payee of a check who does not promptly present
it for payment to a bank has the burden of proving that the maker was
not injured thereby. Hamlin v. Simpson, 105 Iowa 125; 44 L. R. A. 397.
The Jaw presumes that the drawer is injured by the delay and it is in-
cumbent upon him to prove the absence of injury. 5 Cyc. 532 and au-
thorities therein cited. There seems to be nothing in the state of
facts to establish the absence of injury and therefore we must presume
that the drawer was injured.
As to what is a reasonable time in which to present a check for
payment, Kilpatrick v. B. &. 14. Association, 119 Pa. 30, is in point. In
this case a mortgage debtor was held not liable where a check became
worthless by reason of the solicitor of a corporation failing to present
the check within six months. If a corporation is liable for the negli-
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gence of its agent in such a case, surely a man is liable for his own
negligence.
In this case, therefore, after the lapse of a reasonable time for pre-
sentation of the check by Hinkle, the giving of the check to him oper-
ated as a satisfaction of the debt, unless it appear that Carroll sustained
no loss. Nothing appears to rebut this presumption of loss.
It is unnecessary to decide whether the statute of limitations ap-
plies.
Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF' SUPERIOR COURT
Carrol's check was simply the instrument through which Hinkle
was to obtain from Carrol's bank $175 of Carrol's money on deposit.
Hinkle has not used the check. When he presented it June 5th, 1908, the
bank refused to pay it. Why then should Carrol not pay it? Is he to
continue to keep the money he owed Hinkle simply because Hinkle has
allowed him to keep it for nearly six years? A strange reason that
would be.
If Carrol, having given the check, had left a deposit in the bank to
meet it for four years, and the bank had become insolvent, so that the
deposit was wholly lost to him, there would be sufficient reason for
putting the loss on Hinkle. Having occasioned the continuance of the
deposit with the banker until his insolvency, he should suffer the
loss.
In this case there is no suggestion of insolvency. The evidence is
that the deposit had been withdrawn by Carrol four years after deliv-
ering the check. There was then no loss, save possibly of the interest
upon the deposit.
The evidence is not clear whether the deposit which continued in
the bank for four years was large enough to cover $175. The burden
may properly be put on the plaintiff to show that it was not. In the ab-
sence of evidence on the point, the defendant should not be liable for
any interest for the period between the issue of the check and the total
withdrawal of the deposit. The defendant would properly be liable for
$175 and for interest from the withdrawal of the deposit to the rendition
of the verdict.
The check was given on August 16th, 1902. If this be taken to
be the day on which the duty of paying the check arose, the
statute of limitations would not bar the action until August 17th, 1908.
The suit begun on August 16th, 1908, was begun within six years.
Menges v. Frick, 73 Pa. 137; Edmundson v. Wragg, 104 Pa. 500; Lutz's
Appeal, 124 Pa. 273.
We have not contested the principle insisted on by the learned court
below that "the burden of proof is on the holder should he seek to re-
cover from the drawer, to show that he has not been injured by the
holder's failure to make presentation within the prescribed time." 5
Cyc. 532. It sufficiently appears that no loss save of interest has oc-
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curred by reason of Carrol's delay, and it matters not which of the
parties furnished the evidence. The aforesaid principle, however, has
been repudiated in Rosenbaum v. Hazard, 233 Pa. 206.
Pertinent cases on the question are Flemming v. Denny, 2 Philada.
111; Rice v. Daniel, 16 W. N. C. 35; Bradley v. Andrus, 107 Fed. 196;
53 L. R. A. 432.
Judgment reversed with v.f. d. n.
HARRIS v. LIFE INS. CO.
Life Insurance-Death of Insured by State Execution
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Harris and another were partners. Harris' wife, who was insured
in defendant's company, killed her husband's partner. She was con-
victed and executed. Harris now brings suit to recover the amount of
the policy.
Fine for Plaintiff.
Long for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
POWELL, J.-It is the policy of every state to uphold the dignity
and integrity of its courts of Justice and to prevent the execution of
contracts that appear to be contrary to public interests.
The counsel for the plaintiff argues that the prospects of obtaining
the amount of the policy would be no inducement to the insured to com-
mit murder, for he would not live to enjoy it: Why, to allow the bene-
ficiaries of a policy to recover in which the insured was executed for
murder, would be simply offering a reward for the perpetration of crime.
As early as 1830 the English courts held in the case of Amicable
Society v. Bollard (5 H. L. C. 70), that an assignee of a policy of life
insurance could not recover when the insured was executed for a capital
felony, although the policy contained no express stipulation against
such an event. If such a contract were valid, would it not remove the
restraint from the commission of crime?
In Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362, the question
was, "Do insurance policies insure against crime?" and it was held that
"Public Policy forbids insertion in a contract of a condition which tends
to introduce crime, and as it forbids the introduction of such a stipula-
tion, it also forbids the enforcement of a contract under such circum-
stances that cannot be lawfully stipulated for."
We consider therefore on the grounds of public policy that the law
of Pennsylvania forbids a recovery upon a policy where the insured has
been executed for crime, and this whether the policy contained a
clause upon the subject or not, and even if it stipulated that the com-
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pany shall be liable in such a contingency, Collins v. Metropolition Life
Ins. Co., 13 Dist. 384.
In Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362, referred to
above, Judge Brewer held that even if the insured was executed for a
crime of which he was innocent, there can be no recovery. Can there
be a legal life insurance against the miscarriage of justice? Can con-
tracts be based on the probability of judicial murder? If one policy so
written is valid, the business of insuring against the fatal mistake of
juries and courts would be legitimate. The same principle may be
applied to the case at bar only with much greater force, for in this case
the insured was justly executed for murder.
Wells v. Ins. Co., 191 Pa. 207; Seidenbender et. al. v. Charles' ad-
ministrators, 4 S. & R. 151; Thorne v. Ins. Co., 80. Pa. 15, all hold that
contracts against public morals and principles cannot be enforced and
are void.
We think that the facts of this case clearly come within the rule
adopted by courts of England, Pennsylvania and many other states of
the Union, and to enforce such a contract would be in direct opposi-
tion to public principles and morals.
Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The United States Supreme Court, in a very recent case, decided
that death by legal execution for crime is not covered by a policy of life
insurance, tho the policy contains no provision, excepting such manner
of death from the risks covered by it. North Western Life Ins. Co. v.
McCue, 223 U. S. 234. In so deciding the court simply followed a pre-
vious decision in Burt v. Union Central Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362. The
same doctrine has been announced by the courts of England and by the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Collins v. Ins. Co., 27 Super. 353. In
support of its conclusion the Pennsylvania court said. "The reason for
the refusal of the court to aid one who founds his action upon his own
criminal act is because of the public interests involved, which require
that laws against crime be enforced and that the courts aid no man to
take a profit from their violation. The rule is enforced upon the ground
of public policy alone and not out of consideration for the defendant to
whom the advantage is incidental."
In deference to these authorities we affirm the judgment of the
learned court below, but we do so with great reluctance. We regard as
utterly silly the contention that a contrary holding "would tend to
induce crime."
WILLIAM HILTON v. ADAM KOLLOM
Recording Act-Unacknowledged Deed-Notice to
Subsequent Vendee
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A former owner of land conveyed it by an unacknowledged deed to
William Hilton, who did not take possession of the land. Seven
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
months subsequently, the former owner, conveyed the same land to
Adam Kollom, who at once took possession. William Hilton's deed was
on record and Adam Kollom read the record of it before he made his
purchase.
Wallick for Plaintiff.
Locke for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SURRAN, J.-In the common law the doctrine of registry is un-
known. The livery of seisin for estates of freehold and entry for es-
tates for years were the only notorieties which it demanded in such
transactions. The first step toward registering conveyances is found
in the statute of enrollments, being an appendage to the statute of
uses (27 Henry VIII C. 10). In the United States the advantages
which are to be derived from the general registration of all conveyances
has been fully realized and perfected. These laws vary in the differ-
ent States, but the object of the registry laws is manifest. "The pur-
pose of this record [registry laws] is not to furnish proof of the state of
the title or even of the transaction set forth in a recorded instrument,
but to give to every person proposing to acquire by purchase an in-
terest in land which has already been conveyed, bargained away, en-
cumbered or leased by the person from whom such interest is to be ac-
quired or his privy, notice of such prior conveyance, contract, en-
cumbrance or lease." Minor and Wurts Real Prop. P. 828, Para. 1072.
Therefore the question here is this: Under the circumstances stated
was Adam Kollom an innocent purchaser? By reading the record,
though unacknowledged, the court is of the opinion that such notice
was sufficient, at least, to cause any person contemplating the purchase
of the property, to exercise a reasonable amount of caution before pro-
ceeding further. "Particular persons in contracts," says Lord Hard-
wicke in Chesterfield v. Jansun,"shall not only transact bona fide be-
tween themselves, but shall also transact bona fide in respect of other
persons, who stand in such relation to either as to be affected by the
contract or the consequences of it."
It was held in Kerns v. Swope, 2 Watts 75, by Judge Gibson,"that
the vague reports of strangers or information given by a person not
interested respecting a defect of title to land, will not have the effect of
notice to the purchaser." However, this is quite different from reading a
record of the conveyance itself, but even so, the opinion was dissented
from.
Tilghman, C. J., in lessee of Correy v. Paxton and Rees, 4 Binney
139, made this significant statement: "The taking of a legal estate
after notice of a prior right makes a person a mala fide purchaser. It
is a species of fraud and dolus malus itself in the civil law. 2 Atk. 654."
The situation of this case as presented to the court is well ex-
pressed, We think, in a similar case in New Jersey. Said that court:
"If a purchaser has before him facts which should put him on inquiry,
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it is equivalent to notice of the fact in question and where such fact con-
stitutes a fraud on a third party, it will not protect the purchaser that
he purchased for value." Tantum v. Green, 21 N. 3. Equity 364.
It follows then, that since the reading of the record of Adam Kol-
loin was a sufficient warning to cause him to inquire further in the
title to the property, he acquired no right therein, as against William
Hilton.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The deed to Hilton was not legally recorded. The recorder has au-
thority to record only those deeds which have been acknowledged or
proved, and the Hilton deed had been neither acknowledged nor proved.
What, however, purported to be a copy of this deed was in fact a
copy. There was a deed to Hilton and its tenor was reproduced in the
recorder's deed-book. Not having been legally recorded, there was no
duty on the part of Kollom to examine the record. Had he not exam-
ined it, he would have been in no default and he could not be regarded as
having the information which he would have had, had he examined it.
He in fact examined the record. It told him that an earlier deed for
the same land had been delivered to Hilton. Was this enough to
awaken a suspicion that such a deed had in fadt been delivered? Should
he not have suspected that the recorder would not have made the record
unless he had had a deed before him as original, purporting to be the
grantor's, and which the recorder believed genuine? Should he not
have suspected that this deed had been presented for record by Hilton,
the grantee named in it, and that Hilton was therefore claiming the
land under it? We think he should.
Suspecting then that Hilton had a deed, under which he claimed the
land, had Kollom a right to go on and purchase the same land from the
grantor without taking the trouble to inquire of Hilton whether he in
fact had a genuine deed? We think not. The purchase of the land
from Hilton's grantor, with such information as Kollom had, with the
intention to claim the land from Hilton was, we think, fraudulent. We
concur with the learned court below in concluding that Kollom had
sufficient notice of the earlier deed to disable him from claiming the
land as against Hilton.
A different view was taken by Gibson, C. J., in Kerns v. Swope, 2
W. 75, and the Supreme Court of Kansas, largely relying on that au-
thority, has also decided that the reading of the record of an improperly
recorded deed was not notice of the contents of the deed. Nordman v.
Rau, 86 Kan. 19. .38 L. R. A. N. S. 400. The able dissenting opinion
in that case is, however, the more convincing. The learned annotator
in the L. R. A. N. S. pronounces the decision "against the weight of
authority, and, it would seem, the rule of reason." Smith and Tudor,
the learned commentators of Leading Cases in Equity, commenting on
Kerns v. Swope, observe that whether the second purchaser read the
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record of the earlier improperly recorded deed, was a question for the
jury, which had not been submitted to it and that Gibson, C. J.'s,
position that even if he had been found to have read the record of the
deed, he could not be affected by it, was questionable. "But," they
say, "the court would seem to have gone too far in saying that if such
evidence had been adduced [i. e., of the second purchaser's having read
the record] it would not have sustained an inference of notice,"
citing Hastings v. Cutler, 4 Foster (24 N. H.) 481.
That purchasers must inquire when cognizant of facts that awaken
suspicion, is not an unfamiliar doctrine. If B about to buy land from X,
finds A in possession, he must suspect that A has some claim to the
land, and he must inquire of X what the basis of the claim is. It is as
reasonable to require B, wben he learns that there is a record of a deed
for the land which he is about to purchase, in which A is grantee, to
inquire of A before he makes his purchase.
Convinced of the propriety of the decision of the learned court be-
low, we must affirm its judgment.
Affirmed.
FARMERS' BANK v SIMCOX
Deceit-Honest Belief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Adam Ferguson owned shares of stock in a bank for which he held
certificates. These were stolen by X, who, purposing to sell the stock,
requested Simcox to identify him at the bank as Ferguson. Simcox
went to the bank with X and assured the officials that he (X) was Fer-
guson. Simcox acted in good faith, being himself mistaken. The
bank therefore cancelled the old certificates and issued new ones to Y,
an innocent purchaser, for value. Ferguson repudiated the transaction
and the bank was obliged to issue stock certificites to him, and then
brought this action against Simcox.
Dorn for Plaintiff.
Burd for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE TRIAL COURT
KOUNTZ, J.-It seems, that as a general rule of law, a person who
makes a mis-statement of a material fact in good faith, believing on
reasonable grounds that it is true, is not liable in deceit. But be must
have reasonable grounds for his belief.
But the rule in Pennsylvania is, undoubtedly, that a person cannot
be held liable in deceit if he entertained an honest belief in the truth of
his representations, no matter how unreasonable were the grounds on
which the belief was founded. "In an action of deceit," says Chief
Justice Gibson, in one of the early cases on this subject, "the jury
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have to deal with a question of good faith, and if they are satisfied that
the defendant believed his own story, they must find for the defend-
ant." This rule, laid down in Bokee v. Walker, 2 Harris 139, was fol-
lowed in Delworth v. Bradner, 85 Pa. 238; Duff v. Williams, 85 Pa. 490;
Erie City Iron Works v. Barber, 102 Pa. 156; Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa.
353, etc. "The scienter must be both alleged and proved." Griswold v.
Gebbie, supra.
Lamberton v. Dunham, 165 Pa. 129, cited by the learned counsel
for the defense, was an action for trespass in deceit in certifying to the
correctness of a signature to a check, which was in fact forged. The
defendant testified that he was familiar with the supposed indorser's
signature, and that this was the signature of the indorser. The court
held that the only ground for recovery for false representation is bad
faith in making the representation, and that the reasonableness of the
defendant's ground for his belief in his representation cannot be
called into question.
In the case at bar, an action of trespass for deceit, a scienter is
neither alleged nor proved; in fact, the defendant's good faith is ad-
mitted.
Judgment is entered for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
It would have been possible for Simcox, for a consideration, to have
guaranteed the accuracy of his identification of X. He might then have
been made liable on this guaranty, by an appropriate action. He gave
no guaranty, nor is the action founded on any guaranty.
The action is for deceit. X, identified by Simcox as Ferguson, was
not Ferguson. The bank has been misled to its injury. But for a mis-
representation, having no element of fraud or deceit in it, Simcox is
not responsible. He "acted in good faith, being himself mistaken."
The learned court below has properly decided that there being no de-
ceit, and no guaranty, there is no liability. Lamberton v. Dunham,
165 Pa. 129, is similar to the case before us.
In Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353, Mitchell, J., observes: "A man
who is shown to have made a false statement, from the consequence of
which he will be relieved, if he himself believed it to be true, even on
insufficient grounds, should at least be charged with the burden of
showing that he did have such belief." The burden in this case has
been lifted by Simcox. The evidence shows that he "acted in good
faith, being himself mistaken."
Further decision is made unnecessary by the careful opinion of the
learned court below.
Affirmed.
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COMMONWEALTH v. JOHN FISKE
Selling Liquor without License by an Incorporated
Social Club
STATBM4NT OF FACTS
Merchants' Club was incorporated under the act of 1887 for "social
enjoyment." The club bought liquors and sold them to such of its mem-
bers as chose to pay for them. A steward was employed to attend to
such sales, receiving a salary. The prices charged were calculated so
as to barely cover the cost of the liquors and the steward's salary, so
that no profit was made from the sales. Fiske is the steward and he
has made sales to members. The club has no license to sell liquors.
The defendant is indicted for selling liquors without license.
Davis for Plaintiff.
Ferio for Defendant.
OPINION OF THR COURT
FRY, J.-The defendant is indicted for selling liquor without a
license in violation of "liquor law" of 1887. The question is, was the
stewaid of an incorporated club in selling the liquor to members of the
club guilty of selling without a license in violation of the statute.
The license laws cannot be evaded by the device of a pretended
club, whose chief object is the sale of liquors to members, as the law
looks through all disguises in such cases and pronounces the sale un-
lawful. Comm. v. Tierney, 148 Pa. 552; Comm. v. Brem, 5 Super
Ct. 104; Comm. v. Steffner, 2 D. R. 152; and even a regularly organ-
ized club cannot sell liquor to others than its own members without in-
curring the penalty provided in the act. Commonwealth v. Loesch, 153
Pa. 502; Commonwealth v. Heffner, 8 Legal Gazette 166.
In the above cited cases it is clearly seen that no purpose other than
the sale of liquor was intended, or if any other purpose was expressed,
it was a mere sham to evade the liquor license act. In the case now
before us a different purpose existed.
The club was organized for "social enjoyment." A bona fide club
formed for proper purposes may furnish liquor to its members without
profit out of a common stock and such furnishing does not constitute
an illegal sale within the meaning of the act of 1887. Klein v. Liv-
ingston Club, 177 Pa. 224; Comm. v. Smith, 2 Super Ct. 474. The ques-
tion is, what are properpurposes? They include "good faith of the or-
ganization, the method of selection of members, the common owner-
ship of its property, the manner of distribution among the members,
and the fact that sales are made to none except members." Comm. v.
Pefferman, 12 Super Ct. 209. There could be no true "social enjoy-
ment" without these proper purposes, and these purposes have been
carried out by the club in this case.
There seems to be some doubt as to whether the transactins be-
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tween the steward and members of the club was a sale. Mr. Justice
Backburn says: "A contract concerning the sale of goods may be de-
fined to be a mutual agreement between the owner of the goods and
another, that the property in the goods shall for some price or consid-
eration be transferred to the other, at such time and in such a manner
as is there agreed." In this case there is no one who can be called the
owner, as the liquor was the common property of the club. The stew-
ard, although he did give the members liquor for money, was not a
seller, but was hired to distribute this common property of the club to
those members desiring it. The transaction lacks the usual incidents
of sale, namely, "the aim by the vendor at profit" and "the element of
bargain."
The next question which arises is that of profit. If the intention of
the club was the sale of liquor for profit, there is no doubt it would be
a violation of the statute, but here the prices charged barely covered the
cost of the liquors and the steward's salary. Thus there was no profit
derived by the sale of the liquor. The steward's salary is only an in-
cident to distribution of the liquor and cannot be held as profit, as it
did not result in any benefit or profit to the club.
In Klein v. Livingston Club, 177 Pa. 224, Mr. Justice Dean said:
"the intent must govern; if the object of the club is merely to provide
members with a convenient method of obtaining drink, then it falls
within the terms of the law. But on the other hand, if the-club is organ-
ized and conducted in good faith, with a limited and selected member-
ship and formed for social, literary, or other purposes, to which furnish-
ing of liquor to its members is a mere incident, then it cannot be con-
sidered within the purpose or letter of the law."
In view of the leading cases which have been adjudicated on this
subject, we think the defendant is not guilty.
Verdict for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The opinion of the learned court below is amply sustained by the
authorities cited. All of the authorities upon the question involved are
collected in 12 L. R. A. N. S. 519, 20 L. R. A. N. S. 1095, 23 L. R. A. N.
S. 192, 38 L. R. A. N. S. 101, 23 Cyc. 205, 18 A. & C. 361. From these
authorities it appears that there is a conflict of opinion, the weight of
authorities according with the decision of the learned court b. low.
Judgment affirmed.
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BOOK REVIEW
Conduct of Law Suits, Out Of and In Court-by JOHN C. REED.
2nd Edition. LrTL,.e, BRowN & Co., Boston, 1912.
This work, which originally appeared in 1885, has just re-appeared
in a second edition from the press of the distinguished publishers,
Little, Brown & Co. A noteworthy feature of this edition is an appre-
ciative introduction by Prof. John H. Wigmore. "I have long admired
this book," says the Professor, "and am glad to see it going into
another edition. It is for several reasons most admirable in its kind."
He enumerates the points that its standards of conduct are high, and
yet practical; that its treatment of problems is based on a thoughtful-
ness, a large philosophy, and a shrewd perception of human nature,
and that it covers unwritten experience systematically from beginning
to end. Following an introduction comes the first book on Conduct
Out of Court, which is divided into six chapters; on the case offered,
principles of preparation, preparation of the law, other particulars of
preparation, plan of conduct, briefs. Book two has an introductory
chapter, followed by chapters on opening the pleadings and the case,
beginning of presentation of evidence, cross-examination, re-examina-
tion, note-taking, argument, new trial and appeal, victory and defeat.
The final chapter is on the character of the successful lawyer. After
this abstract of the contents, which will give a conception of the scope
of the book, it will be enough for us to add that the work ranks high
in the class to which it belongs, and its study must prove exceedingly
useful to the beginning practitioner. The text covers 426 pages.
